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ABSTRACT
The Military Retirement Fund (MRF) was established in 1984 and
accrual accounting procedures were adopted to manage it. Prior to 1984,
military retirement was funded on a "pay-as-you-go" basis, meaning that
annual appropriations from general revenues or borrowing were used to
cover retirees' pensions. This thesis reviews the developments which led
to the establishment of the MRF, the mechanics of the accrual accounting
procedures, the procedures followed by Congress in budgeting for the
MRF, and the investment plan and the securities chosen for investment of
MRF funds. While the Military Retirement Fund and its accrual accounting
system are not highly visible components of the DoD budgetary and
funding process, their impact on retired military personnel, the DoD budget
and the national debt is significant. In addition, the Military Retirement
Fund and accrual accounting were instrumental in paving the way for the
reform of military retirement benefits in FY 1986. An understanding of this
system and the unique problems that it presents provides a valuable
contribution to further understanding of the defense budget and its
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In FY 1985, the Military Retirement Fund was created and
accrual accounting procedures were adopted. The establishment
of the Military Retirement Fund was part of a larger plan by
Congress to transform the funding method for the Military
Retirement System (MRS) . The Defense Authorization Bill for
Fiscal Year 1984 contains the reform legislation which became
effective on 1 October 1984 and was the primary tool for
transforming military retirement funding. Prior to FY 1985,
the MRS was funded on a "pay-as-you-go" basis, meaning that
annual appropriations from general revenues or borrowing were
used to cover retirees' pensions. In FY 1985, this system was
transformed into an accrual accounting system which utilized
the Military Retirement Fund to accrue the cost of future
retirees and operate it similar to a trust or pension fund.
Accrual accounting is a method of accounting which
recognizes current liability activity which has not yet
resulted in cash payments or outlays. The result is that
accrual accounting can present a more accurate picture of the
financial status of an organization or entity.
While the Military Retirement Fund and its accrual
accounting system is not a highly visible component of the DoD
budgetary and funding process, its impact on retired military
personnel, the DoD budget and the national debt is
significant. In addition, the Military Retirement Fund and
accrual accounting were instrumental in paving the way for the
reform of military retirement benefits in FY 1986. An
understanding of this system and the unique problems that it
presents will provide another window into understanding the
national budgetary process.
B . OBJECTIVES
The purpose of this thesis is to describe and critique the
system used by the Federal Government to budget for military
retirement. A brief history of the military retirement system
and the incentives which led to reform will be presented. The
FY 1985 reform that shifted the government's approach from a
system for paying retirement costs out of current revenues and
borrowing, to an accrual accounting plan intended to achieve
advance funding for this significant entitlement program will
be explained. In addition, the investment strategy developed
to accrue funds to pay future retirement costs will be
described and the role of Congress in determining the funding
level will be examined. As with any significant accounting
change, problems and concerns have developed. This paper
will attempt to gain an understanding of problems and concerns
which have occurred subsequent to the establishment of the
Military Retirement Fund and as a result of downsizing, fiscal
constraints and investment strategies
.
C. THE RESEARCH QUESTION
The primary research question is this: "What changes were
made in FY 1985 to the accounting procedures and budgetary
process of the Military Retirement System and how does the new
system accumulate funds to pay for future retirement costs?"
Subsidiary questions to be addressed include:
• How did the Federal Government pay for military retirement
costs prior to the establishment of the DoD Military-
Retirement Fund in FY 1985?
• What were the major changes incorporated in the
establishment of the DoD Military Retirement Fund in FY
1985?
• What are the statutory requirements governing the
management and operation of the DoD Military Retirement
Fund?
• What actions have been taken by the DoD to implement this
new system?
• When is the DoD Military Retirement Fund expected to be
fully funded?
• How is money budgeted by Congress for the Military
Retirement Fund?
• What is the investment strategy employed by the DoD Office
of the Actuary in investing money budgeted by Congress?
• What are the problems or limits associated with the
management of the DoD Military Retirement Fund from an
investment perspective?
• How has the 1986 law, which decreased future retired
military benefits, changed the flow of resources into the
Fund?
• How have fiscal constraints and military downsizing
affected the management of the Fund?
• Are other agencies or branches of government diverting
assets from the Fund?
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
The focus of this thesis will be on the mechanics of the
accounting change in FY 1985 and the operation of the Military
Retirement Fund. Special attention is given to the investment
strategy associated with the operation of the Military
Retirement Fund and the problems and concerns that have
occurred subsequent to its establishment.
The data used in numerical presentations will be limited
to FY 1992 and earlier due to the time lag in source document
publication. Information related to problems and concerns of
the Military Retirement Fund will be drawn from documents
available in FY 1993 and earlier.
E . METHODOLOGY
This thesis is based on an examination of materials
generated by the Department of Defense Office of the Actuary,
studies and reports produced by government offices and private
corporations, e.g., the Congressional Budget Office, the
General Accounting Office, the American Enterprise Institute;
federal legislation including statutory law and congressional
reports, hearings and other scholarly materials such as
journal articles and books that address the subject of
budgeting for military retirement and investing public
employee retirement funds.
While a majority of the congressional hearings and studies
concern the high cost and benefits of the Military Retirement
System and not accounting changes, they do provide great
insight into the incentives and perceptions associated with
the MRS which led to the reform.
F. DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS
The following list of acronyms, abbreviations and
definitions are provided in the interests of clarification.
Military Retirement System (MRS) - MRS is an acronym which
refers collectively to the benefits and accounting aspects of
military retirement pay.
Military Retirement Fund (MRF or Fund) - The Fund or MRF
is a term used to refer to the federal trust fund, created by
the reform in FY 1985, which accumulates resources for
retiree pay.
Accrual Accounting - Accrual accounting is a method of
accounting which adjusts accounts to reflect current activity
which will result in actual cash or financial outlays at some
time in the future.
Fund Liabilities - Fund liabilities represent the claims
of military retirees on trust fund assets which will require
payment in the future
.
Unfunded Liabilities - Unfunded liabilities represent the
future claims of military retirees on assets which do not
currently exist within a trust fund. These liabilities are
designated as unfunded.
G. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY




Chapter II: BUDGETING FOR MILITARY RETIREMENT OUT OF
CURRENT RESOURCES: THE PRE-REFORM SYSTEM
This chapter describes the legislative and funding history
of the Military Retirement System. The congressional
perception of the Military Retirement System and circumstances
which drove the system to reform will be examined.
Chapter III. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE MILITARY RETIREMENT FUND: THE
REFORM OF FY 1985
This chapter defines and examines the mechanics of the
accounting reform in FY 1985. The statutory requirements
which govern the fund will be explained and the effects on the
DoD budget and federal accounting procedures will be examined.
Chapter IV. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGETING FOR THE MILITARY
RETIREMENT FUND
The different methods by which Congress appropriates funds
for the Military Retirement Fund will be studied. The
Military Retirement Reform Act of 1986, which reduced future
retiree benefits, and the 1993 budget reconciliation process
will be presented to illustrate how Congress reduces military
retiree benefits to achieve deficit reduction.
Chapter V. THE MANAGEMENT AND OPERATION OF THE MILITARY
RETIREMENT FUND IN THE DOD: THE ORGANIZATION
AND OPERATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE ACTUARY
This chapter will describe the organization of the DoD
Office of the Actuary. An outline of the methods by which the
Office of the Actuary calculates the amounts to be transferred
into the Fund will be presented as well.
Chapter VI . THE INVESTMENT PLAN OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE MILITARY RETIREMENT FUND
This chapter will explain the timetable established for
completing the payment on the unfunded liability, the
investment strategy chosen and the securities selected for
investment. Concerns over the MRF's current funding
arrangement and the limits and problems associated with the
Military Retirement Fund from an investment perspective will
be discussed.
Chapter VII. PROBLEMS AND CONCERNS OF THE MILITARY
RETIREMENT FUND
This chapter will describe a recent diversion of Fund
assets and potential future diversions. In addition, the
consequences of such diversions will be discussed.
Chapter VIII. SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS
This chapter summarizes the findings and analysis
presented, and makes recommendations for the operation of the
Military Retirement Fund.
II. BUDGETING FOR MILITARY RETIREMENT OUT OF CURRENT




Essential in gaining an understanding of the evolution of
military retirement funding is establishing a historical
perspective from the origins of the system up to FY 1985, just
before the accounting reform legislation became effective.
This chapter will explore the legislative and funding
evolution, and the pre-reform public and congressional
perception of the Military Retirement System (MRS) . This is
the pre-reform era whereby funding for retiree pay came
directly out of the general funds available to Congress on a
"pay-as-you-go" basis.
B. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The beginnings of the United States Military Retirement
System can be traced back to a British statute which, in 1593,
granted compensation for disabled military members [Ref . 1: p.
5] . The Pilgrims at Plymouth Rock, in 163 6, granted that a
disabled soldier should be maintained by the colony for the
duration of his life [Ref. 2: p. VII-1]
.
The early predecessors to current military retirement
legislation come from statutes enacted by the Federal
Congress. On August 26, 177 6, the first national pension law
granted half pay for life for disabled soldiers. Following
the Revolutionary War, the disability amount was set at five
dollars per month for noncommissioned officers and one-half
pay for officers. From 1790 to 1855, legislation modified
the disability system to increase the pension and include
widows. [Ref. 2 : pp . VII -1 & VII-2]
The first true non-disability military retirement
legislation was passed in August 1861 and was designed to
prompt older soldiers unfit for field duty in the Civil War, to
voluntarily retire. In December 1861 and through-out 1862,
additional legislation was passed that allowed for non-
disability involuntary retirement of Army, Navy and Marine
Corps officers with 45 years of service or at age 62. These
officers were given monthly retired pay of approximately $3 6.
While these laws allowed for involuntary retirement, they did
not mandate it. [Ref 3: pp. 371-372]
From 1870 (post Civil War) to 1916, the non-disability
retirement system continued to evolve and grow in legislative
statutes. The significant legislative changes which occurred
during this period are listed below. [Ref 2: pp. VII & VII-3]
• Retired pay formula based on active duty salary system.
• Mandatory officer retirement at age 64.
• Voluntary officer retirement after 30 years with 75
percent pay plus allowances.




In 1916 legislation was passed which is the foundation of
the current retirement system and has changed only slightly.
The law integrated an officer "up-or-out" selective promotion
plan with a monthly retirement formula. The monthly formula
is as follows: 2.5 percent times the number of years of
service up to 30, times the final monthly basic pay, or a
maximum of 75 percent of basic pay. The law also established
the enlisted Fleet Naval Reserve which by 1946 had adopted a
2 year minimum and the standard 2.5 percent formula which the
officer program used. An Army reduction in strength in 1922
utilized the retirement system to help achieve its endstrength
goals. Officers with as little as 10 years of service were
chosen for retirement and received the standard formula of 2.5
percent of basic pay times years of service up to 75 percent
of basic pay. Those officers with over 20 years of service,
had a modified retirement formula which replaced the 2.5
percent multiplier with 3.0 percent. [Ref. 3: pp. 373,374]
Another early retirement program was authorized for the
Army in 1935 to reduce a surplus of officers from World War I.
Army officers with at least 15 years service were authorized
to voluntarily retire with the standard 2.5 percent of basic
pay formula. Other than its suspension during World War II,
it remained in effect until 1948. [Ref. 3: p. 374]
By 193 8, post World War I overmanning in the Navy resulted
in legislation which allowed for officer retirement after 20
11
years of service. This eventually became the model for all
the services and the current system.
From 1938 to 1984 significant events which helped mold the
pre-reform system are listed below. [Ref. 2: p. VII-12 to
VII-17]
Mandatory retirement at age 62
.
The 2 year voluntary retirement was made available to
Army and Air Force officers and enlisted.
More stringent promotion/mandatory retirement standards.
Reserve and National Guard added to retirement system.
Retired pay adjustment procedures (recomputation) replaced
by cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs)
.
Modified retirement formula for those who entered service
after September 8, 1980. Average of the highest three
years of service is used instead of terminal pay in
computing monthly retirement amount.
While not an aspect of the benefits legislation, Public
Law 95-595 was passed in November 1978 and required that an
actuarial statement be furnished to Congress with respect to
military retirement. [Ref 4: pi].
In 1983, Public Law 98-94 was passed. This law contains
the accounting reform legislation which went into effect in FY
1985 and established accrual accounting and the Military
Retirement Fund. The details of this significant accounting
change will be fully explored in chapter three.
While they are a smaller component of the retirement
system, the disability and survivors benefits programs are
12
considered an integral part of the MRS. The disability-
retirement program evolved concurrently with the non-
disability retirement program and its entitlements are based
upon a standard schedule of disabilities established by the
Veterans Administration. In like fashion, the survivors
program evolved and became the Survivor Benefit Plan which was
established in 1972, the substance of which is still in effect
today. [Ref. 5: pp. 1-5]
The composition of MRS recipients is depicted in Figure












Source: Statistical Report on the Military Retirement System, FY 1991
Figure 2.1 Benefit Distribution
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recipients (83.9 percent), followed by disability recipients
(9.6 percent) and survivor recipients (6.5 percent) . [Ref. 5:
P- 18]
C. FUNDING HISTORY
Initially, funds for the military disabled were provided
for by the States. The Act of April 30, 1790 (1 Stat. 121)
instituted the Secretary of War as the principal pension
administrator [Ref 2: p. VII-1]
.
For a period of time, the Navy provided disability
payments out of a pension fund. The income to the fund
consisted of the proceeds from captured enemy or pirate ships
and interest on these assets. This fund was abolished in 1935
and the MRS moved fully into an unfunded basis. [Ref 6: p. B-
6] .
With the exception of the Navy trust fund, which was
abolished in 1935, the funding method for the MRS prior to FY
1985 can best be described as an unfunded or "pay-as-you-go"
method. Annual appropriations from general revenues or
borrowing were provided to cover retirees' pensions. The
outlays to retirees were wholly dependent upon money obtained
through taxes and the sale of government bonds. Under "pay-
as-you-go" funding, payments to eligible retirees were not
dependent on whether sufficient funds existed in a pension
fund, but upon the legislation authorizing payments and the
funds obtained through taxes and borrowing.
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The most practical way of understanding the flow of funds
to retirees prior to FY 1985 is through appropriation title.
The budget process depicted in Figure 2.2 is described below.
Under the Department of Defense budget (budget sub-function
051), five major appropriation titles existed: Military
Personnel (MILPERS) , Retired Military Personnel, Operations
and Maintenance (O&M) , Procurement, and Research, Development,
Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) [Ref 7: p. 9-20].
The first step occurred when the Department of Defense
submitted its annual budget which it had derived via the
Planning Programming Budgeting System (PPBS) . Within the
annual defense budget submitted to the President was the
Retired Military Personnel account request, along with the
other major appropriation accounts. The annual budget was
then incorporated into the President's Budget and submitted to
Congress. Upon approval by Congress, in the form of annual
appropriations, the DoD was granted the obligational authority
to pay military retirees. Throughout the year, the
disbursement of these monies would occur via the Treasury.
[Refs. 2,8: pp. VII-19 & VII-20, pp. B-4 to B-8]
This method of budgeting and paying for the Military
Retirement System remained in effect until modified by the















Source: Fifth Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation
Figure 2.2 Pre-Reform Funding
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D. PRE-REFORM PERCEPTIONS
But I think it is important we do make some kind of
calculation, Mr. Chairman, that we somehow figure out,
rather than throwing up our hands and saying it is an
impossible task, that we just don't know what these
numbers are. We have to make some kind of an estimate to
see really what we are going to be doing to future defense
budgets if we pass these things (military retired pay
recomputation)
.
Les Aspin, 4 October 1974
The military retirement system is wasteful in dollars
and human resources
.
The President's Commission on
Military Compensation, 1978
Is it fair to millions of taxpayers who don't collect
military pensions that we pay so much retired pay to so
many retirees who aren't retired at all? This may be the
ultimate special interest boondoggle. And there are more
than 900,000 lobbyists working hard to see that this elite
of unretirees keeps getting its subsidy.
Les Aspin, 4 April 1983
There probably is no other retirement system which is as
liberal and costly as the U.S. Military Retirement System.
Grace Commission, 1984
As can be seen from the above comments, the MRS had come
under sharp criticism and scrutiny in the seventies and early
eighties. Over a 15 year period prior to the accounting
reform in FY 1985, there had been nine major proposals to
revamp military retirement benefits [Ref. 9: p. 623]. As
depicted in Figure 2.3, DOD retirement outlays had grown
from $3.5 million in 1940 to $16.4 billion in 1984 [Ref. 5:
pp. 12,13] . It was for good reason Congress and others were
concerned with cost. Congress became increasingly convinced
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Source: Statistical Report on the Military Retirement System, FY 1992
Figure 2.3 Retirement Outlays
Aspin cogently stated, there was no definitive way to come to
grips with the impact of the unfunded liability created by the
MRS. The projections were that it would continue to increase.
As a percent of the DoD budget, retirement costs had increased
from 1 percent in 1954 to 7.4 percent in 1984 [Ref 7,10: p. 9-
25, p. 506 ] .
The increase was largely attributed to four factors.
These factors were: (1) a large increase in the retired
population which, as depicted in Figure 2.4, had grown from
3,029 in 1900 to 1.3 million in 1984 [Ref 5. pp. 8-13]; (2)
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Source: Statistical Report on the Military Retirement System, FY 1992
Figure 2.4 Retirees Receiving Benefits
increase due to basic pay (retired pay base) ; and (4) increase
due to retired Cost of Living Allowance (COLA) increase. [Ref
11: p. F-l]
In addition to the perception that the MRS was too costly,
a view was rapidly gaining acceptance that the MRS was
outdated in two less publicized but still significant areas.
1. Lack of a Formal Pension Fund
In 1974 the Employees Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) was passed. This act required that private pension
plans prefund their retirement obligations and amortize the
19
unfunded liabilities over a specific period of time. The
intent behind this was to provide for stable and dependable
retirement programs in the private sector. While the
government had mandated that the private sector prefund
retirement obligations, Congress was more hesitant about
applying the same standards to federal retirement programs.
The lack of federal conformity to ERISA repeatedly surfaced
and by 1983 Congress was earnest about establishing a military-
pension fund. [Ref. 12: pp. 112,154,181]
2 . Outdated Accounting Procedures
Arthur Andersen & Company, an accounting firm,
completed a study in 1975 of Federal Government accounting
practices. This report reinforced to Congress that the
accounting procedures of the MRS were, as in the case of other
federal pension plans as well, outdated and in need of change.
The quotes detailed below succinctly make this point. [Ref.
13,14: pp.1, 2, p. 1]
. . .all too often, the financial statements of government
units have proven to be less than adequate for providing
basic financial information.
Arthur Andersen & Company, 1975
Accrual accounting should be adopted. This was
recommended by the Hoover Commission and is required by
Public Law 84-863, which was passed in 1956.
Arthur Andersen & Company, 197 5
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E. THE IMPACT OF CONGRESSIONAL PERCEPTIONS
Fully cognizant of the negative reports on the MRS,
Congress became intent on coming to grips with the high costs
of the retirement system. In addition, a proposal by the
Carter Administration in April 1978 recommended that Congress
change the accounting procedures for the MRS. The
Administration's proposal for a trust fund and accrual
accounting were similar to those recommended by ERISA and
Arthur Anderson & Company and would provide a significant
update to its accounting procedures.
In order to understand the true cost of the unfunded
liability created by the MRS, Congress passed Public Law 95-
595 in November 1978 which required that a financial and
actuarial statement of the MRS (as well as other federal
pension systems) be furnished to Congress. Actuarial and
financial statements are logical steps in preparing for a
pension fund. An actuarial statement provides the mortality
rates for a given population. Using this information, a
financial statement could then be prepared which would show
the unfunded liability of a pension plan. The reasoning
behind this can be seen from Les Aspin's comments. Documents
which would show the actual cost of military retirement on
future years would be invaluable in understanding the effects
of benefit increases or decreases.
21
F. SUMMARY
The MRS had grown tremendously in legislation and benefits
since its inception during the early history of the United
States. By 1983, numerous independent studies of the MRS had
been completed and the vast majority of them claimed the MRS
was overly generous and even prodigal . Congressional
perception of the MRS as too costly and its accounting
procedures as outdated became more concrete and Congress
positioned itself for change by requiring actuarial and
financial statements. By 1983 the MRS was ripe for reform in
both accounting procedures and benefit generosity.
22
III. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MILITARY
RETIREMENT FUND: THE REFORM OF FY 1985
A. INTRODUCTION
The creation of the Department of Defense Military
Retirement Fund was the result of pressure to raise cost
awareness and to update accounting procedures in the Military
Retirement System. This chapter will discuss the precursors
to the actual legislation and explain the accounting changes
and budgetary impact brought about by the accounting reform in
FY 1985.
B. LEGISLATIVE PRECURSORS
In April 1978, the Carter Administration proposed for FY
1979 the establishment of a retirement fund, accrual
accounting and changes in retirement benefits for the
military. The proposals for the retirement fund and accrual
accounting were largely accepted by the House Armed Services
Committee and H. R. 12392 was introduced. This bill, as well
as a 1979 follow on, H.R. 3261, never made final passage.
[Refs. 14,15: p. 1, p. 63]
On April 16, 1980, Les Aspin dropped into the hopper his
proposal titled "Uniformed Services Non-Disability Retired Pay
Reform Act". This proposal contained legislation for a
retirement fund, accrual accounting and a major rewrite of
23
retirement benefits. This bill also never made final passage
and as Les Aspin's quote (below) predicted, raised the
atmosphere of distrust for Congress by service personnel.
[Ref. 16: pp. 8115-8117]
I realize that I have been labeled a Pentagon critic and
some think I am anti-military and out to 'get' the
serviceman. Since this bill is not in the usual tradition
of increasing benefits, I am certain it will only increase
that feeling.
Les Aspin, April 16 1980
By 1983, two more proposal were in the works. The first
one, forwarded by the Reagan Administration, had largely
adopted the Carter Administration's proposals less the
benefits modifications. The second proposal was another House
Armed Services Committee proposal sponsored by Les Aspin. The
two proposals differed only in the technical aspects of the
retirement fund. In addition, these proposals addressed only
the retirement fund and accrual accounting and saved the
battle over retirement benefits for another day. [Ref. 9,17:
p. 3, pp. 9,10]
The House Armed Services Committee version prevailed and
on Sept 24, 1983, Congress passed Public Law 98-94, also cited
as the "Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1984". Under
section 925 is the legislation that amended Title 10, United
States Code by adding chapter 74 and established the
Department of Defense Military Retirement Fund. [Ref. 18: §§
1461-1467]
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C. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MILITARY RETIREMENT FUND
The purpose of the Military Retirement Fund is laid out
straightforward by the federal code.
There is established on the books of the Treasury a fund
to be known as the Department of Defense Military
Retirement Fund (hereinafter in this chapter referred to
as the 'Fund'), which shall be administered by the
Secretary of the Treasury. The Fund shall be used for the
accumulation of funds in order to finance on an
actuarially sound basis liabilities of the Department of
Defense under military retirement and survivor benefit
programs
.
10 U.S.C. § 1461
The Fund was given a budget sub-function code of 602 under
the Income Security Group (function 600). Outlays from the
Fund are therefore contained outside of the defense function
(050) and the DoD military budget. However, when the national
budget is listed by agency, the Fund is listed under the
Department of Defense-Civil [Ref. 19: p. Appendix-525] . The
net result is that outlays from the Fund are contained outside
the defense function, but there is also a recognition that
Fund outlays are attributed to the military. The Fund and its
accrual accounting system became effective on 1 October 1984
(FY 1985) . The assets of the Fund come from three sources as
depicted in Figure 3.1 and as detailed in the below sub-
sections. [Ref. 17: pp. 2-11]
1 . Funds Received by the Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense is required to pay into the
Fund at the end of each month a contribution designed to fund
the future retirement liability created by military personnel
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Sources: Fifth Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation and 10 U.S.C. §§ 1462 and 1466
Figure 3.1 Sources of Military Retirement Fund Assets
currently on active and reserve duty [10 U.S.C. § 1466] . This
contribution to the fund is referred to as the "retirement
accrual charge" or "normal cost" of the Military Retirement
System. This contribution is computed, using actuarial
techniques, as a percentage of the total basic pay paid that
month to members of the armed forces (the U.S. Coast Guard is
under a separate retirement system) . In FY 1985, this number
came to approximately 51 percent of basic pay. In FY 1992,
the normal cost was 40 percent of basic pay due to changing
economic assumptions and modifications in benefits for future
retirees. In order to pay for this retirement accrual charge
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for current active and reserve forces, Congress increases the
annual appropriation account for military pay by what ever
percent is determined necessary to fund the future liability
of retirees. [Ref. 3,6: p. 604, pp. 18,19]
The effect on the DoD Military Personnel (pay and
benefits) account can be seen in Table 3.1 based upon the FY
TABLE 3 . 1 ACCRUAL CHARGE IMPACT ON MILITARY PAY ACCOUNT
Accrual Charge Impact FY 1983-1985
(FY 1984-1985 estimates)





Source: President's Budget FY 1985
1985 President's Budget. The FY 1985 budget is an ideal year
to capture the impact on the Military Personnel account since
it shows the two years before the change and the year the
accrual charge was to take effect. President's Budgets
submitted after FY 1985 recompute the Military Personnel
account to include the accrual charge. As Table 3.1 shows,
the difference between FY 1984 and FY 1985 is approximately
$19 billion. Of the $19 billion, two billion was for pay
raises and $17 billion was transferred to the Military
Retirement Fund (sub-function 602). The $17 billion is 51
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percent of the basic pay account but only 35 percent of the
Military Personnel account since basic pay is only a part of
the entire pay and benefits a service member receives. [Ref.
7: p. 9-25]
2 . Funds Received from the U.S. Treasury
At the beginning of each fiscal year, the Secretary of
the Treasury pays into the Fund an amount certified by the
Secretary of Defense. These assets, which are General
Government funds, are transferred by the Secretary of the
Treasury from the Central Personnel Management account (sub-
function 805) to the Military Retirement Account (sub-function
602) . [10 U.S.C. § 1466]
The purpose of these funds is to amortize the original
unfunded liability of the Military Retirement System and
account for cumulative gains and losses to the MRF . The
original unfunded liability is the money needed to pay for the
retirement cost of members of the armed services for their
service prior to FY 1985. This is a group of service
personnel that contains both active and retired personnel.
[10 U.S.C. § 1465] The original unfunded liability was
determined to be $528.7 billion and is currently being
amortized over 60 years [Ref. 3,6: p. 604, p. 12] . Gains and
losses to the Fund result as a consequence of changing
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benefits, actuarial assumptions and experience changes 1 .
These gains and losses are amortized and added to or
subtracted from the unfunded liability payment to make the
annual Treasury payment [Ref 6: pp. 12, O-10].
Prior to FY 1985, the unfunded liability was being
paid by the Retired Military Personnel account on a "pay-as-
you-go" basis. Once the Fund was established, the Retired
Military Personnel account was phased out and funds for
retirees are now being paid out of the Military Retirement
Fund. The effect on these accounts is highlighted by Table
3 .2.
TABLE 3 . 2 EFFECT ON RETIRED PAY ACCOUNT
IMPACT ON RETIRED MILITARY PAY ACCOUNT
(1984 and 1985 estimate)
(outlays in millions of dollars)








Sources: President's Budget FY 1985 - 1987 and the DOD
Statistical Report On The Military Retirement
System FY 19 91
^ains and losses as well as the unfunded liability will be
discussed in greater detail in Chapters V. and VI.
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3 . Funds Received as Interest on Assets
The third source of assets for the Fund is the
interest earned by the Funds ' s resources. This is clearly
laid out by the federal code.
The Secretary of the Treasury shall invest such portion
of the Fund as is not in the judgment of the Secretary of
Defense required to meet current withdrawals. Such
investments shall be in public debt securities with
maturities suitable to the needs of the Fund, as
determined by the Secretary of Defense, and bearing
interest at rates determined by the Secretary of the
Treasury, taking into consideration current market yields
on outstanding marketable obligations of the United States
of comparable maturities. The income on such investment
shall be credited to and form a part of the Fund.
10 U.S.C. § 1467
When interest is earned from the securities held by
the Fund, the interest is transferred from the Treasury's
account titled "Interest on Public Debt" (sub-function 901)
into the Fund (sub-function 602).
D. THE BOARD OF ACTUARIES
There is established in the Department of Defense a
Department of Defense Retirement Board of Actuaries
(hereinafter in this chapter referred to as the 'Board')
.
The Board shall consist of three members, who shall be
appointed by the President from among qualified
professional actuaries who are members of the Society of
Actuaries
.
10 U.S.C. § 1464
To provide oversight of the Fund, Congress provided for
this independent Board appointed by the President and serving
for 15 years. The Board has several functions which are
listed below.
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• Report to the Secretary of Defense annually on the
actuarial status of the Fund.
• Report at least every four years to the President and
Congress on the status of the Fund.
• Approve all actuarial methods, assumptions and
amortization schedules used in determining the DoD
contribution to the Fund.
• Approve all actuarial methods, assumptions and
amortization schedules used in determining the amount
given to the Secretary of the Treasury to meet the
unfunded liability amortization.
In fulfilling their role as independent actuaries, the
actuaries work closely with the Department of Defense Office
of the Actuary. This office produces the annual DoD
Statistical Report On The Military Retirement System and the
annual Valuation Of The Military Retirement System. All data
used by the Board are draw from these two offices and their
records. [10 U.S.C. § 1464]
E. SUBSIDIARY ACCOUNTING CHANGES
The accounting changes which provide for fund transfers
from Military Personnel (sub-function 051), Central Personnel
Management (sub-function 805), and Interest on Public Debt
(sub-function 901) into the Military Retirement Fund (sub-
function 602) produce a chain reaction of subsidiary
accounting transactions. The reason for these subsidiary
accounting transactions is to prevent double counting in the
unified budget. For example, when funds (budget authority)
are transferred from the Military Personnel account to the
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Fund, it is charged against the Military Personnel account
(hence U.S. Treasury) as an outlay. In reality, this is not
a federal outlay since the transfer is intragovernmental . To
compensate for this outlay and prevent double counting,
offsetting receipts are created in another account [Ref . 7,17:
pp. 9-20 to 9-27, pp. 12,14]. In addition, when the Fund
purchases a security and the Treasury sells the security, this
also is considered an intragovernmental transfer [Ref. 6: p.
16]. Table 3.3 demonstrates how offsetting receipts are
implemented to prevent double counting in the unified budget.
F. PAYMENTS FROM THE FUND
The assets of the Fund are available to three basic groups
of retirees.
• Personnel on the retired list of the Army, Navy, Air Force
and Marine Corps and the Fleet Reserve and Fleet Marine
Corps Reserve list.
• Survivors of Members of the armed forces.
• Former members (disabled) of the armed forces.
These assets are transferred from the services via the
Fund, to eligible retirees.
G. IMPACT ON BUDGET OUTLAYS
The establishment of the Fund and its accrual charge has
served to decrease outlays in the defense function. When the
DoD assumed responsibility for the retirement accrual charge,
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TABLE 3.3 OFFSETTING RECEIPTS
OFFSETTING RECEIPTS


























Sources: President's Budget FY 1993 and the Congressional
Budget Office
the Military Retired Pay account was eliminated and the
responsibility was transferred to the U. S. Treasury (Central
Personnel Management) and the Income Security Group (Military
Retirement Fund)
.
The actual difference to the DoD budget can
therefore be determined by comparing the DoD accrual charge to
the cost of actual outlays from the Fund. The difference that
the accounting reform has made for the DoD budget function is
summarized by Figure 3.2.
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IMPACT ON DOD (MILITARY) BUDGET




1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Year
Sources: President's Budget and Valuation of the Military Retirement Fund FY 1985-FY 1992
FIGURE 3.2 Impact On DoD (military) Budget
These decreases are largely attributed to military
downsizing and the FY 1986 reduction in future retiree
benefits. These two factors reduce the monthly accrual charge
that the military must pay for current service members
.
Because the accrual charge immediately responds to the
number of personnel in the DoD and any retirement benefit
changes, the visibility of defense manpower decisions--and the
incentive to economize on manpower--is increased [Ref. 14,17:
p. 15, pp. 10,11] . Under the pay-as-you-go system, retirement
costs were not necessarily considered for new service members
since the cost did not show up for another 20 or more years.
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Under the current system, policymakers now automatically
consider the impact of future retirement costs when they make
manpower decisions [Ref. 6: p. 18]
It is significant to note, however, that the Fund makes no
difference on unified budget outlays. Outlays to retirees are
unchanged by the creation of the Fund and the
intragovernmental outlays supporting the Fund are compensated
by offsetting receipts. What is changed, is the national debt
which has increased by the amount of assets contained in the
Fund. The assets in the Fund are federal debt instruments and
thus increase the federal debt through the Fund's recognition
of MRS liabilities.
H. SUMMARY
The Military Retirement Fund became effective in FY 1985
and serves to pay for the costs of military retirement. The
accounting reform arranges the cost of military retirees into
two separate categories. The normal cost of future
retirements is given to the DoD and the cost of the original
unfunded liability is given to the U.S. Treasury. To deal
with intragovernmental fund transfers, offsetting receipts
were incorporated for both of the above costs and interest on
the Fund's assets. While the Military Retirement Fund has no
direct effect on federal outlays, it has raised the federal
debt, decreased defense function outlays, increased outlays
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from the Treasury's General Fund and increased the awareness
and visibility of DoD manpower decisions.
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IV. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGETING FOR THE MILITARY RETIREMENT FUND
A. INTRODUCTION
".
. .no money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in
consequence of appropriations made by law. .
.
Article 1 Section 9, U.S. Constitution
While the Constitution states that money drawn from the
Treasury must be appropriated by Congress, there are varying
methods by which Congress can appropriate money for government
functions. This chapter presents the current funding flow and
the different methods by which Congress appropriates money for
the Military Retirement Fund and military retirees. The
Military Retirement Reform Act of 1986, which reduced future
retiree benefits, will be explained. In addition, the 1993
budget reconciliation will be presented in detail as an
example of how Congress reduces Military Retirement Benefits
(MRB) to achieve deficit reduction.
B. ANNUAL APPROPRIATIONS
An appropriation creates obligational or budget authority
to fund authorized programs or functions. Programs which fall
under the annual appropriation process must be appropriated
each year in order to sustain their funding [Ref. 20: pp.
46,47]. Annual appropriations are mostly made up of
discretionary spending. Because the military's retirement
accrual charge is linked to the Military Personnel account,
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which is under the annual appropriation process, the accrual
charge for retirement funding also goes through the annual
appropriation process. This can be seen in Figure 4.1 which
shows the overall funding flows and the various appropriations
for the Fund.
The legislation which provided for the Military Retirement
Fund makes it clear that the accrual charge should go through
the annual appropriation process.
The Secretary of Defense shall determine each year, in
sufficient time for inclusion in budget requests for the
following fiscal year, the total amount of Department of
Defense contributions to be made to the Fund during that
fiscal year under section 1466(a) of this title.
10 U.S.C § 1465
Because funds for the Military Personnel account are
largely based on legislation governing pay and allowances,
Congress cannot change the level of funding for personnel pay
and allowances without changing the laws governing them. If
Congress lowered funding for the Military Personnel
Appropriation, it would also have to change the laws which
mandate a specific pay level for service members. In this
sense, the Military Personnel appropriation can be considered
an entitlement.
However, because the Military Personnel appropriation is
a function of endstrength and pay levels, which must be
authorized annually, the Military Personnel appropriation must






Sources: Fifth Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation and 10 U.S.C. §§ 1462 and 1466
Figure 4 . 1 Current Funding Flow
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appropriation--like the remainder of the defense budget--is
entirely discretionary.
The annual appropriation process for the MRF is similar to
that which existed prior to the accounting reform in FY 1985.
The first step occurs when the Department of Defense submits
its biennial budget, derived via the Planning Programming
Budgeting System (PPBS) . Within the defense budget submitted
to the President is a request for the Military Personnel
account, a specified portion of which is designated for the
Military Retirement Account. The defense budget is then
incorporated into the President's Budget and submitted to
Congress. Congress authorizes the DoD endstrength and pay
adjustments and then appropriates the funds associated with
the endstrength for the Military Personnel account. The
annual appropriation grants DoD budget authority to make
monthly accrual payments into the MRF for service personnel.
C. PERMANENT APPROPRIATIONS
As an alternative to annual appropriations, Congress can
create legislation which makes budget authority available each
year without new action required by Congress [Ref . 8: p. C-8]
.
Appropriations created by this method account for a
considerable portion of the federal budget and are termed
"permanent appropriations". Many entitlement programs,
including portions of Military Retirement Benefits (MRB) , are
funded through permanent appropriations [Ref. 20: p. 49] . The
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two large arrows on the right side of Figure 4.1 identify the
permanent appropriation flows going into the MRF
.
The cost of the original unfunded liability for military
retirement is funded through permanent appropriations. When
general funds (budget authority) are transferred from the
Treasury to the Military Retirement account, no annual
appropriation is required, as inferred by federal statutory
law:
. . .the Secretary of the Treasury shall promptly pay into
the Fund from the General Fund of the Treasury the amount
certified to the Secretary by the Secretary of Defense
under paragraph (3) . Such payment shall be the
contribution to the Fund for the fiscal year...
U.S.C. Title 10 Chapter 74, § 1466
Because actual cash outlays from the Fund to retirees
consist of funds received through annual and permanent
appropriations, Congress saw no point in requiring further
appropriations and simply made the assets of the Fund
available to eligible retirees. In this sense, assets from
the Fund pay out as permanent appropriations. The below quote
reflects congressional intent on this issue:
The assets of the Fund are hereby made available for
payments under subsection (a)
.
10 U.S.C. § 1463
One other permanent appropriation goes into the Fund,
namely, the interest received from the Treasury securities
held as Fund assets. Because interest must be paid and
federal interest costs will fluctuate as interest rates
change, Congress has determined that it would be pointless to
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appropriate for this purpose every year. Therefore, Congress
created legislation which permits interest payments to be made
without requiring annual appropriations. [Ref. 21: p. CRS-5]
While the above paragraphs describe the different
appropriations which fund the MRS, they also reveal that
Congress has different options and appropriation channels to
choose from should it become necessary to reduce retirement
outlays as part of a larger effort to reduce spending to lower
the deficit
.
D. THE MILITARY RETIREMENT REFORM ACT OF FY 1986
As detailed in the previous section, Congress can target
annual or permanent appropriations to achieve savings in the
portion of annual spending devoted to military retirement. In
1986, Congress focused on reducing MRB costs by reducing the
annual appropriation flow into the Fund.
After the accounting reform in FY 1985, Congress continued
the battle over the high cost of the MRS. Because of the
accounting reform, the accrual charge (normal cost) could be
targeted separately from the payment for current retirees.
One consequence of this separation was to increase the
political feasibility of cutting payments for military
retirees. [Ref. 9: p. 623]
On April 4, 1985, then-House Armed Services Committee
Chairman Les Aspin opened the debate by calling for a four
billion dollar cut in the President's $18 billion request for
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future military retirees . The Pentagon was required to come
up with proposals to change current legislation to accommodate
Aspin's cut. Furthermore, Congress wanted the cuts to have a
"grandfather" clause which would protect those currently
retired or about to retire. The cut was supposed to
immediately reduce outlays in the defense function because it
was to target (reduce) the accrual charge going into the Fund
by changing future retiree benefits. However, it would be
many years before the unified budget would see the reductions
because those already retired and those who entered military
service prior to 1 August 1986 would not be affected. [Ref . 9:
p. 623]
The result of the drive to reduce retirement costs was the
Military Retirement Reform Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-348) .
While the initial impact on the DoD budget was modest, the
impact over the long run produces significant savings.
The means by which the Retirement Reform Act of 1986
achieves its savings is by reducing two elements of
retirement benefits for those entering military service on or
after 1 August 1986.
1. Penalty for Years Less Than 30 Retirement
Those entering military service on or after 1 August
1986, and who retire with fewer than 30 years of service,
receive a temporary penalty until age 62. Monthly retired pay
is computed by multiplying terminal basic pay or the average
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of the last three years (for those who entered after September
8, 1980) of basic pay times a multiplier. The multiplier
prior to 1986 was as follows: 2.5 percent times the number of
years of service up to 30. For retirees entering the military
service after 1 August 1986, the multiplier is reduced by one
percentage point for each full year under 30. For example,
the multiplier for a 20 year retiree is 40 percent (50 percent
minus 10 percent) as compared to 50 percent under the old
system. At age 62, their retired pay is recomputed without
the penalty. [Refs. 5,6: p. 2, p. A-2]
2. Cost of Living Reductions
Retirees who entered prior to 1 August 1986 typically
receive an annual COLA based upon the Consumer Price Index
(CPI) . This is commonly referred to as full CPI protection.
The Retirement Reform Act of 1986 altered this, so that
Retirees first entering military service on or after 1 August
1986 receive the annual full CPI increase minus one percent.
At age 62 the benefits are restored to the amount that would
have been payable had full CPI protection been in effect.
After this restoral, partial indexing (CPI minus 1 percent)
continues annually. [Ref 5: p. 1]
E. THE EFFECTS OF THE MILITARY RETIREMENT REFORM ACT OF 1986
When the Senate Armed Services Committee forwarded the
bill containing the substance of the Military Retirement
Reform Act, the Committee expressed its intent to bring to a
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conclusion the controversy and strife over the appropriate
level of military retirement pay.
The continuing uncertainty about the future of military
retirement benefits has undermined morale in the Armed
Services, led many of our fine young men and women in
uniform to pursue careers elsewhere, and created an
atmosphere of distrust for the Congress by our service
personnel. It may well be that this uncertainty has had
more adverse effects on retention in the Armed Forces than
will the changes to military retirement now recommended by ,
the Committee. In making this recommendation, the
Committee intends to end the long debate over the
appropriate level of benefits provided under the military
retirement system. [Ref. 23: p. 9]
The effect of the Military Retirement Reform Act of 1986
was to reduce, relative to what it would have been, the flow
of annual appropriations into the Fund. This law reduces DoD
outlays, but will not affect outlays in the unified budget
until those service personnel who entered after 1986 achieve
retirement status. The Act also produces a subsidiary effect
on the permanent appropriation coming from the Treasury. The
1986 law reduced future benefits and caused the Fund to
experience an immediate gain. Because the Treasury's annual
payment includes amortized gains or losses to the Fund, the
Treasury's annual payment is reduced by the amortization of
the 1986 benefit change.
While the Military Retirement Reform Act of 1986 ended a
heated debate over retired pay, fiscal pressures have
continued to bring retired pay and its COLA back into
budgetary scrutiny.
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F. BUDGET RECONCILIATION IN 1993 AND MILITARY RETIREMENT
BENEFITS
While the Military Retirement Reform Act of 1986 mainly
targeted the annual appropriation side of funding for retiree
benefits, a different approach occurred in 1993. As part of
the large deficit reduction goals set forth by President
Clinton, entitlement spending was targeted for major
reductions. The procedural mechanism Congress uses to cut
entitlement programs is budget reconciliation. Because the
reconciliation process affects entitlement programs, the
permanent appropriations component of Military Retirement
Benefits was subject to reduction [Ref 21. p. CRS-22] . Figure
4.2 depicts the 1993 budget reconciliation process as it
changed Military Retirement Benefits (MRB) . The subsections
below correspond to the circled numbers in Figure 4.2 and
explain the methods employed in reducing MRB as part of
reconciliation in 1993.
1. The President's Budget
Traditionally, the President's Budget is delivered in
early February; however, President Clinton's Budget was not
delivered until April 8, 1993. Despite this, Congress was
able to commence work on the budget because in his February 17
address and in his report "A Vision of Change for America,
"
President Clinton had outlined a plan that formed the basis of



























































































Figure 4.2 Budget Reconciliation and Retirement Benefits
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February 17, 1993, the President cited federal pay and COLAs
as one of the sources of deficit reduction [Ref . 24: p. 401] .
Congress took this to heart in the 1993 reconciliation process
and specifically targeted a number of federal entitlement
programs, including the military retiree COLA.
2. House Budget Resolution
Upon receipt of the President's plan, the Budget
Committees of the Senate and House began formulating
strategies in response to the deficit reduction targets set by
President Clinton. The House Budget Committee completed its
work on March 10, 1993 by approving House Concurrent
Resolution 64 (H. Con. Res. 64) [Ref. 25: p. 708]. The
instructions in H. Con. Res. 64 required the House Armed
Services Committee report changes in laws governing military
retiree benefits which would produce savings of $186 million
in FY 1994 and $3,940 million of savings in FY 1994-1998 [Ref.
26: pp. 86,261] . The assumption of the House Budget Committee
was that these savings would be produced by a "diet-COLA"
proposal . The substance of the plan was that retirees under
age 62 would receive only half of the annual COLA. When
retirees turned 62, full COLAs would be restored. In
addition, a cap of $400 per retiree was to be placed on COLAs
for FY 1994. [Ref S . 26,27: p. 51 p. 1]
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3. Full Passage of the House Budget Resolution
On March 18, 1993 the full House of Representatives
adopted H. Con. Res. 64 [Ref. 25: p. 708]. While H. Con. Res.
64 was modified in other areas, the targets for MRB reduction
remained unchanged at $186 million in FY 1994 and $3,940
million for FY 1994-1998 [Refs. 25,26: pp. 698,700 p. 261].
4 . Senate Budget Resolution
The Senate Budget Committee completed its work on
March 11, 1993, approving Senate Concurrent Resolution 18 (S.
Con. Res. 18) [Ref. 25: p. 708]. The instructions in S. Con.
Res. 18 to the Senate Armed Services Committee required no
reduction in MRB [Ref. 28: pp. 9,47]. When S. Con. Res. 18
was reported out by the Senate Budget Committee, Senate
Democrats warned that they were not pleased with the results
and that it would require modification [Ref. 29: p. 653]
.
5. Full Passage of the Senate Budget Resolution
True to their words, Senate Democrats amended S. Con.
Res. 18 on the floor. However, when S. Con. Res. 18 was
passed by the Senate on March 25, 1993, none of these
amendments affected the amount of saving to be achieved
through cuts in MRB. [Refs. 30,31: p. 786 p. S 3704].
6 . Budget Resolution Conference And Final Passage
To resolve the difference between the Senate and the
House on this issue and on many others, the Budget Resolution
Conference was held. The conference committee completed work
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near the end of March and produced a conference report which
accompanied H. Con. Res. 64 [Ref . 32: p. 1] . The conference
report required both the House and Senate Armed Services
Committees to report to their respective Budget Committees
changes in MRB laws which would produce savings of $12 8
million in FY 1994 and $2,361 million in FY 1994-1998 [Ref.
32: pp. 17,19] . The full House adopted the conference report
on March 31, 1993. Final passage of the budget resolution
occurred on April 1, 1993 when the Senate adopted the
conference report. [Ref. 33: p. 872]
7 . House Budget Reconciliation
On May 12 1993, the House Armed Services Committee
(HASC) submitted to the House Budget Committee its proposal to
meet the required MRB savings mandated by the Budget
Resolution. Instead of the "diet-COLA" proposal, the HASC
approved a "roll -back" plan which would delay rather than cut
the COLAs [Refs. 34,35: p. 1208 p. H 3040].
The House Budget Committee completed work on its
version of the reconciliation bill and approved House
Resolution 2264 (H.R. 2264) on May 20, 1993. The MRB
reduction goals from the House Budget Committee were now $237
million in FY 1994 and $2,595 million in FY 1994-1998. These
numbers were obtained by accepting the substance of the House
Armed Services Committee "roll -back" plan which delayed the
COLAs [Ref. 36,37: p. 1391, pp. 5, 14]. For FY 1994 the COLA,
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which retirees normally receive in January, would be delayed
until April. The additional COLA delays for FY 1995-1998 are
listed below [Refs. 35: p. H 3040].
• FY 1995 - July
• FY 1996 - October
• FY 19 97 - January 19 98
• FY 1998 - April 1999
8. Full Passage of House Reconciliation Bill
The House reconciliation bill, H.R. 2264, was taken to
the full House and passed on May 27, 1993. The MRB reduction
targets of $237 million in FY 1994 and $2,595 million in FY
1994-1998 were unchanged as was the COLA "roll-back" plan used
to achieve these numbers. [Ref. 37: pp. 5,14]
9. Senate Budget Reconciliation
In early June 1993, the Senate Armed Services
Committee (SASC) submitted to the House Budget Committee its
proposal to meet the required MRB savings mandated by the
Budget Resolution. As in the House, the SASC approved a
"roll-back" plan for COLAs rather than the "diet-COLA"
proposal. For FY 1994-1997 the COLA, which retirees normally
received in January, would be delayed until Oct 1. For FY
1998, the COLA would occur on Sept 1. [Ref. 38: p. 1460]
The Senate Budget Committee completed work on the
Senate version of reconciliation and approved Senate
Resolution 1134 (S. 1134) on June 18, 1993. The MRB
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reduction targets as reported by the Senate Budget Committee
were now $540 million in FY 1994 and $2,653 million in FY
1994-1998. These numbers were obtained by acceptance of the
Senate Armed Services Committee "roll-back" plan which would
delay COLAs for nine months in FY 1994-1998 and eight months
in FY 1998. [Ref. 37,39: pp. 5,14 p. 1616]
10. Full passage of Senate Reconciliation Bill
The Senate reconciliation bill, S. 1134, was taken to
the full Senate and passed on June 24, 1993. The MRB
reduction targets of $540 million in FY 1994 and $2,653
million in FY 1994-1998 were unchanged, as was the SASC ' s COLA
"roll-back" plan used to achieve these numbers. [Ref. 37,40:
pp. 5,14 pp. S. 7994,7986]
11. Budget Reconciliation Conference and Final Passage
The conference convened to resolve the difference
between the reconciliation bills passed by the Senate and
House started work on July 15 and reported a bill on August 5,
1993 [Ref. 41: p. 2127]. The MRB reduction for FY 1994 was
agreed upon at $180 million, and the FY 1994-1998 target was
put at $2,358 million. The method of obtaining these numbers
was also a compromise. The delay in retiree COLAs for FY 1994
is three months, while the delays for FY 1995-1998 are nine
months [Ref. 42: p. 8] . The full House passed the conference
report on August 5, 1993, with the Senate following the next
day. President Clinton signed the bill into law on August
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10,1993 [Ref. 41,43: p. 2127 p. 2220].
According to the provisions of H.R. 2264, only those
who entered military service prior to 1 August, 1986 are
subject to cuts, since those who entered after 1 August, 1986
already had their COLAs reduced as a result of the Military
Retirement Reform Act of 1986. The adjustment applies to all
service retirees except disabled retirees and dependent
survivors. [Refs. 40,42: p. S 7994 p. 8]
G. THE IMPACT OF MILITARY RETIREMENT COLA DELAYS
The effect of the COLA delay on federal spending will be
an immediate reduction in outlays from the baseline, or
projected spending for MRB. This reduction is the result of
changing laws which govern the permanent appropriations
(payment on the original unfunded liability) going into and
coming out of the Military Retirement Fund.
It should also be acknowledged that there may be a
subsidiary effect on the annual appropriations (accrual
charge) going into the Fund. Because the accrual charge is
based upon economic assumptions, one of which is the expected
COLA, the COLA delay in FY 1994-1998 may also reduce a portion
of the accrual charge required by the DoD [Ref. 6: p. 20]
.
To gain perspective on the size of the spending reductions
in MRB in relation to total deficit reduction produced by the
1993 reconciliation act, a breakdown of the savings is
provided. According to the Office of Management and Budget,
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The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 will reduce
budget deficits by a total of $504.8 billion over the period
between FY 1994 and FY 1998. Of this $504.8 billion, $250.1
billion, or roughly half of the total deficit reduction,
results from tax increases. The remaining $254.7 billion
comes from cuts in spending and interest payments.
The spending cuts consist of $107.7 billion in
discretionary programs and $71.3 billion in entitlements. Of
the $71.3 billion in entitlement cuts, $11.5 billion come from
federal retirement programs, of which $2.3 6 billion are the
result of the cuts in Military Retirement Benefits. Thus, MRB
reductions account for 0.5 percent of the total deficit
reduction accomplished by the 1993 reconciliation bill.
Figure 4.3 depicts the relative size of the MRB's
contribution to deficit reduction compared to total deficit
reduction produced by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of






























Figure 4.3 Sources of Deficit Reduction
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H. CONCLUSION
The assets which flow to the Military Retirement Fund come
from permanent appropriations and annual appropriations . The
Military Retirement Reform Act of 1986 provides an example of
how the annual appropriation flow was targeted to produce
savings, while the 1993 budget reconciliation act provides an
example of how the permanent appropriation flow was targeted.
The creation of the Military Retirement Fund has increased the
fiscal flexibility available to Congress as federal budget
constraints continue to require the containment of costs.
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V. BUDGETING FOR THE MILITARY RETIREMENT FUND IN THE DOD
:
THE ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF THE
OFFICE OF THE ACTUARY
A. INTRODUCTION
The Department of Defense Office of the Actuary is the
primary DoD office responsible for determining the appropriate
level of assets to be budgeted for the Military Retirement
Fund in the President's budget and through the Treasury's
annual payment . This chapter will describe the organization
of the Office of the Actuary and the role it plays in the DoD.
An outline of the methods by which the Office of the Actuary
calculates the annual accrual charge for the DoD Military
Personnel appropriation and the annual amount transferred from
the Treasury into the Fund for payment on the original
unfunded liability will be presented as well.
B. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF THE ACTUARY
The DoD Office of the Actuary is located in Arlington,
Virginia and consists of nine personnel, seven of which are
actuaries. The Office of the Actuary works for the DoD within
the Office of the Secretary of Defense. An independent DoD
Retirement Board of Actuaries provides oversight and approves
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all actuarial assumptions and methods used by the Office of
the Actuary [Ref . 6: p. iv. ]
.
The Office of the Actuary produces two documents each year
which are important to the DoD. These documents are the DoD
Statistical Report on the Military Retirement System and the
Valuation of the Military Retirement System. The DoD
Statistical Report on the Military Retirement System presents
a statistical breakdown of DoD retirement recipients. This
report provides information such as the age groups of DoD
retirement recipients, where they live, their ranks, how much
money they receive, their sex, what service they were in, and
more. Most of the information for this report is abstracted
from files submitted to the Defense Manpower Data Center
(DMDC) . [Ref 5. pp. a-d]
The Valuation of the Military Retirement System provides
information crucial to the DoD's budgeting for military
retirement and is described in the following subsections.. In
addition, Figure 5.1 is provided to give the reader an
understanding of the size of the accrual charge and unfunded
liability payment in relation to the entire Military-
Retirement System.
1. Balance Statements on the Assets of the Fund.
The Valuation of the Military Retirement System
incorporates several different balance sheets which describe
and analyze the assets contained in the Fund. The market
SOURCES AND OUTLAYS FOR THE MILITARY
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Quadrennial Report, December, 1992
Figure 5.1 Sources and Outlays for the MRF in FY 1992
value of the Fund's assets is presented, as well as a
comparison of the Fund's present value with the present value
of benefits payable. These balance statements are prepared to
show federal compliance with Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB) statements. The financial standards provided by
FASB require that private sector pension plans present a table
of "Net Assets Available for Benefits" and a "Statement of
Changes in Net Assets Available for Benefits" [Ref. 6: p. n-
2] . These statements provide for accountability and auditing.
The financial statements in the valuation document also
provide information concerning gains or losses to the Fund
which must be taken into account when developing the annual
unfunded liability payment
.
2 . Normal Cost Payments .
Another important feature of the valuation document is
a projection of normal cost payments (the DoD accrual charge)
for future years. The normal cost payment is the monthly
contribution transferred into the Military Retirement Fund by
the DoD. It can be defined as the level percent of basic pay,
contributed annually to an interest bearing fund, necessary to
pay for the future retirement benefits of a group of new
entrants [Ref . 6: p. 8] . As indicated in Figure 5.1 above,
$16.3 billion was transferred into the MRF for this purpose in
1992. Projected normal cost payments are significant to the
DoD since they determine the retirement accrual charge
component of the annual Military Personnel appropriation. The
method by which the Office of the Actuary determines the
accrual charge is outlined below.
a. Calculation of the Normal Cost Payment
The primary question which the Office of the
Actuary answers while determining the annual normal cost
payment is this: How much must the DoD lay aside each year in
order to provide for the future retirement of DoD personnel
currently serving? The basic question involved is one of
present value, but the actual calculations become quite
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involved due to the complexity and size of the DoD retirement
system [Ref. 45: p. 49].
The actuarial method required to be used by the
Office of the Actuary is the "aggregate entry-age normal cost
method" [10 U.S.C. § 1465]. This method allows the Office of
the Actuary to group (aggregate) the participants into
cohorts. It then calculates the normal cost (as a constant or
level percent of basic pay) from the date the member, or
cohort, first became an employee, to the estimated retirement
date [Ref. 45: p. 82]
.
The Office of the Actuary mathematically calculates
the normal cost payment by use of a sophisticated computer
model called "GORGO" run on a mainframe computer. This
computer model takes the military population which falls under
the normal cost system and projects their basic pay into the
future. The projected basic pay is subjected to the relative
percentages of separate benefit formulas. This value is then
discounted back to its present value which is used to
determine the normal cost percentage and payment. [Ref. 6: p.
8, 13, G-2]
Of prime significance in this computer model are
the economic assumptions used in determining projected basic
pay. For accuracy, the economic assumptions are broken down
into short term and long term economic assumptions. Table 5.1
shows the short and long term economic assumptions provided in
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the 1991 Valuation of the Military Retirement System. [Ref 6
pp. iv., 20, G-3,5]




Year COLA Basic Pav Interest
1992 3.7% 4.2% 7.5%
1993 3 .0% 3.7% 7.5%
1994 3 .2% 4.7% 7.5%
1995 ; 3.2% 4.7% 7.5%
1996 3.2% 4.5% 7.5%
1997 3.1% 3.5% 7.5%
Long
Term
1998 + 5.0% 5.5% 7.5%
Source: Valuation of the Military Retirement System,
September, 1991
There are also several non-economic assumptions
that affect the projections. These assumptions can be
categorized as listed below [Ref 6. pp. 5, G-3,5]
.
• Active duty and reserve decrement rates (the rate at which
current service personnel leave the military)
• Retiree decrement rates (mortality rates)
• Internal computer program parameters (member spouse-age
difference, disability factors, etc.)
• Other rates (divorce, remarriage, survivor mortality and
mortality improvement)
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3. Unfunded Liability Payment.
The Valuation of the Military Retirement System also
presents the projected annual payments for the unfunded
liability component. This payment is the contribution that
the Secretary of the Treasury makes out of its general funds,
into the MRF . This payment is for those personnel who, when
the Fund was created, had not had any previous funds accrued
for their future or current retirement. As of September 30,
1984, this unfunded liability totaled $528.7 billion. This
amount and its interest is being amortized over a 60 year
period. [Ref. 6: p. 12]
From a budgeting perspective, the projected payments
on the unfunded liability are significant to the DoD because,
at the beginning of each fiscal year, the Secretary of Defense
must certify the appropriate annual payment for the unfunded
liability. This certified dollar figure is then given to the
Secretary of the Treasury who deposits the specified amount in
the Fund. The size of this payment is determined by the
projected unfunded payment presented in the Valuation of the
Military Retirement System. The method by which the Office of
the Actuary determines the annual unfunded liability payment
is outlined below.
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a. Calculation of the Annual Unfunded Liability
Payment
In a manner similar to the calculations used to
determine the normal cost payment, the "GORGO" computer
program is used to obtain the projected unfunded liability
payment. The benefits for current active and retired military
personnel are projected over the rest of their lifetimes. The
projected value is then discounted to determine its present
value, which is used to calculate an initial current year
payment for the unfunded liability. The retirement benefits
for these military personnel are based on their total military
service time and applicable benefit formulas and basic pay
increases. [Ref. 6: p. 13]
The value of the Fund fluctuates because of
modifications in benefit formulas, unexpected gains and
losses, and changing actuarial assumptions 2 . The changes to
the Fund are generally referred to as gains and losses and are
amortized over 30 years to provide stability [Ref. 6: p. 12].
The annual amortization payment for each change is added to or
subtracted from the initial unfunded liability payment to
arrive at the total for the current year's Treasury payment
[Ref. 6: p. O-10]
.
For example, from Table 5.2, the initial projected
FY 1992 unfunded liability payment was $18.2 billion. The FY
2
"Fund" in this case refers both to the assets held in the
Fund and the amount of the unfunded liability.
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Initial unfunded liability $18.2
Experience gains and losses (4.5)
Changes in assumptions (2.4)
FY 1986 benefit change (0.16)
FY 1987 benefit change 0.01
TOTAL (rounded) $11.2
Source: Valuation of the Military Retirement System,
September, 1990
1992 amortization payment for experience gains was $4.5
billion and is subtracted from the initial payment. This $4.5
billion captures the impact of downsizing as well as other
factors which reduce the amount of the unfunded liability.
The FY 1992 amortization payment, reflecting changes in
actuarial assumptions such as smaller basic pay increases and
reduced COLAs, is captured by the $2.4 billion payment, and is
subtracted from the initial payment as well. The impact of
benefit changes in FY 1986 and 1987 is reflected by the last
two rows. The net of these changes to the unfunded liability
payment, $7.05 billion, subtracted from the initial unfunded
liability payment, is $11.2 billion, the amount shown in
Figure 5.1 being transferred from the Treasury to the Fund.
[Ref. 46: p. O-10]
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C . CONCLUSION
The Department of Defense Office of the Actuary supplies
the Department of Defense with the necessary dollar figures
used by the DoD to budget for military retirement and the
payment on the unfunded liability. The computation of these
dollar figures is executed through a sophisticated computer
model which incorporates the effects of numerous retirement
benefits, decrement rates, DoD specific parameters and a broad
range of economic assumptions.
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VI. THE INVESTMENT PLAN OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
MILITARY RETIREMENT FUND
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will explain the timetable established for
completing the payment on the unfunded liability and will
examine the projected cash flows associated with the Fund.
The investment strategy chosen and the securities selected for
investment will be explained. Concerns over the MRF's current
funding arrangement and the limits and problems associated
with the Military Retirement Fund from an investment
perspective will be discussed.
B. THE INVESTMENT TIMETABLE FOR THE MILITARY RETIREMENT FUND
The Board of Actuaries originally determined that the
present value of the original unfunded liability was $528.7
billion. If, on September 30, 1984, $528.7 billion had been
deposited into the Fund, then the combination of this sum and
the future normal cost payments would have been sufficient to
provide all the expected retirement and survivor benefits for
those in the system on that date. [Ref. 6: p. 12]
Table 6.1 provides an abbreviated past and projected
payment schedule for the unfunded liability as well as normal
cost payments, interest income, disbursements and Fund balance
[Ref. 6: p. 19] . The Office of the Actuary prepares the
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TABLE 6.1 PAST AND PROJECTED "CASH" FLOWS
Military Retirement Fund/ Past and
Projected "Cash" Flows
(in billions)








1985 (actual) $17 $9.5 $1.1 $15.8 $11.8
1986 (actual) $17.4 $10.5 $2.5 $17.6 $24.6
1987 (actual) $18.3 $10.5 $3.6 $18.1 $38.9
1988 (actual) $18.4 $10.3 $4.9 $19.0 $53.4
1989 (actual) $18.5 $9.8 $6.1 $20.2 $67.6
1990 (actual) $16.3 $10.6 $7.3 $21.5 $80.4
1991 (actual) $17.2 $10.8 $8.5 $23.1 $93.7
1992 $17.0 $11.2 $7.6 $24.5 $105.0
1995 $16.1 $13.7 $10.0 $28.0 $137.7
2000 $19.5 $17.9 $15.2 $37.1 $208.7
2005 $24.4 $23.3 $21.6 $50.5 $295.8
2010 $31.0 $30.5 $29.5 $66.9 $403.7
2015 $40.5 $39.9 $40.4 $85.2 $556.1
2020 $53.1 $76.4 $63.8 $107.4 $888.6
2026 $73.4 $132.4 $127.5 $141.9 $1,794.2
2031 $95.8 $173.0 $217.2 $182.5 $3070.8
2036 $125.0 $226.1 $357.4 $236.2 $5066.1
2041 $163.4 $295.5 $573.5 $305.8 $8,149.1
2043 PAYMENT ON UNFUNDED LIABILITY COMPLETE, OTHER CASH FLOWS CONTINUE.
Source: Valuation of the Military Retirement System,
FY 1991
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projected amortization schedule and "cash" flows associated
ith the Fund by using a variation of the "GORGO" computer
model called "open group" projection [Ref. 6: p. 3]. The
current amortization schedule provides for the unfunded
liability through 60 annual payments which will be completed
in the year 2043. In 2043, the unfunded liability will be
paid off and, in this sense, the Fund can be referred to as
fully funded. However, this should not be interpreted to mean
that the Fund is now self-supported by its interest payments.
The DoD accrual charge will still be required to keep the
retirement system financially sound from an actuarial
perspective [Ref. 47: p. 31].
Figure 6.1 is provided to give a long term perspective of
the "cash" flows associated with the Fund. While the
projected cash flows will certainly be modified by changing
economic assumptions, endstrengths, benefits and more, it does
provide an illustration of the temporary role of the unfunded
liability payment (which drops to zero in 2043) and the
increasing role of the interest received from the Fund's
assets. The projections provided by the valuation report also
show that as a percent of basic pay, the normal cost payment
stabilizes at approximately 3 percent, while outlays to
retirees remain relatively constant at between 50 to 60
percent of basic pay [Ref. 6: p. 19]
.
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Source: Valuation of the Military Retirement System, FY 1991
Figure 6.1 "Cash" Flow Projections
C. CONCERNS OVER THE MRF ' S FUNDING ARRANGEMENT
One problem with the current funding method is that the
Treasury's involvement in making payments will not really end
in the year 2 043. To explain this, Table 6.2, which shows
the 1991 total unfunded liability payment, is provided. As
stated above, the unfunded liability payment, $18.2 billion in
1991, will end in 2043. However, the adjustments to the
initial unfunded liability payment--the next four lines in
Table 6.2 which reflect gains and losses, assumption changes,
and benefit changes--will not stop in the year 2043. This is
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Unfunded liability payment $18.2
Experience gains and losses (4.5)
Changes in assumptions (2.4)
FY 1986 benefit change (0.16)
FY 1987 benefit change 0.01
TOTAL (rounded) $11.2
Source: Valuation of the Military Retirement System,
September, 1990
because the original legislation stated that the Treasury is
responsible for the amortization of the unfunded liability and
amortization of changes in the Fund3 resulting from cumulative
actuarial gains, losses and benefit changes [Refs. 18: § 1466]
.
The current downsizing provides an excellent example of
how the Fund experiences a gain or loss. Because fewer people
are staying in the military, the accrual charge is smaller.
Furthermore, the Fund will have more assets in it than it
needs, in relation to the payment plan, because payments in
previous years were based upon a greater number of retired
personnel. This is a gain to the Fund which, according to
legislation, must be amortized and deducted (or added to if a
3
"Fund, " in this instance, means both the assets currently
held in the Fund and the amount of the unfunded liability.
71
loss) from the Treasury's payment on the unfunded liability.
Changes to the Fund will continue to occur, even after the
unfunded liability has been paid off, because projected
interest rates, benefits, etc., will not exactly match with
reality. [Refs. 18,48: § 1466, p. 10]. To put this in a
current perspective, the Treasury captures the benefits of
changes in the Fund as a result of downsizing, lower COLAs,
benefits etc. Certainly the DoD accrual charge is smaller
than projected because of downsizing and lower COLAs because
of fewer people and lower future benefits, but it would be
even smaller if it could capture part of the gains to the Fund
that the Treasury experiences. While being able to capture
gains to the Fund would be to the DoD's benefit now, the
reverse would happen if inflation picks up, or a manpower
build up occurs, or benefits were increased. It is also
debatable whether gains in the Military Personnel Account, as
a result of lower accrual charges, could be reprogrammed to
other areas in the DoD budget
.
1 . Proposals to Change the Current Funding Arrangement
In December, 1992, the Retirement Board of Actuaries
proposed, in the quadrennial report to the President and
Congress, an alternative arrangement for incorporating gains
and losses to the Fund into annual payments. The following
quote provides the substance of the proposal
.
(1) define the Treasury's responsibility to be only the
liability for benefits attributable to service before
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October 1, 1984 (i.e., "the pre-October 1, 1984 accrued
liability"), including subsequent adjustments for
experience, assumption changes, and benefit changes and
(2) define DoD's responsibility to be the liability for
benefits attributable to service since October 1, 1984,
including subsequent adjustments. [Ref. 48: p. 9]
The result would be that the DoD would be able to
capture some of the gains (or future losses) being experienced
by the Fund. In addition, the Treasury's involvement with
making payments into the Fund would end when the unfunded
liability was paid off and adjustments associated with pre-
1984 service are no longer applicable. Five year projections
supporting this proposal show that the 19 97 DoD accrual charge
would be 15 percent lower and the Treasury payment would be
12.6 percent higher than they would have been otherwise. [Ref.
48: p. 9]
Another significant aspect to the proposal is that it
claims to make a stronger link between endstrength and the
retirement accrual charge [Ref. 48: p. 10] . Higher
endstrength would create a higher accrual charge (as compared
to before) and lower endstrength would create a lower accrual
charge. If this proposal was accepted, it would have an
immediate benefit for the DoD and could also serve to
strengthen the DoD incentives to economize on manpower and
consider retirement costs now rather than in the future. It
would have the added benefit of dissolving the Treasury's
responsibility for cumulative gains and losses to the Fund
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once the unfunded liability was paid off. To this end, the
proposal appears to be a positive and constructive change.
There are also potential negatives to the proposal.
The benefit to the DoD, which appears in the form of lower DoD
accrual charges, may have questionable utility. It is
debatable whether lower accrual "savings" could be
reprogrammed to other areas of the DoD budget or count against
spending caps and future spending baselines 4 [Ref. 49: pp.
4,6] . Another potential problem with the proposal is that the
incentives inherent in the accrual charge might be masked or
distorted by large gains or losses in the Fund. Furthermore,
as stated earlier, while the benefits of this proposal would
be positive for the DoD now, they would be negative in the
future if inflation or other factors caused the Fund to
experience a net loss. If this occurred, the Fund would
require more resources from the DoD in the form of upward
adjustments in the normal cost payment.
Whether or not this specific proposal is accepted, an
arrangement which phases out the Treasury's involvement with
4For the interested reader, this topic is covered in the 5
June, 1992 GAO report titled DOD BUDGET, Budget Impact of Proposed
Reduced Retirement Fund Payments . This report discusses the
budgetary impact of a proposed change in the method for calculating
the annual DoD accrual charge. This proposal was never fully
pursued. The report also details the potential impact of changing
actuarial assumptions which occurred later in 1992. The report
highlighted the fact that "savings" from the proposed accrual
charge would not count toward discretionary DoD savings. It also
emphasized that "savings" produced by changing actuarial
assumptions do not represent reductions in defense programs or
long-term federal retirement obligations.
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payments on cumulative gains and losses would be positive. It
would make the funding system more comparable to private
pension systems which have only one entity providing for
payments [Ref. 48: p. 9]. Furthermore, the DoD would
eventually bear the full responsibly of funding future
retirement costs. Any proposal modifying procedures for
adjusting cumulative gains and loss to the Fund would require
federal legislation since it seeks to modify the original
Military Retirement Fund legislation.
D. FUND ASSETS
The assets of the MRF are invested in U.S. Treasury
obligations and are administered by the Secretary of the
Treasury [Refs. 6, 18: p. 5, § 1461]. The Fund's managers
invest in so-called market-based special issues known as the
government account series. Although these securities "mirror"
securities that have been issued to the public and have
identical maturity dates and coupon rates, they cannot be
marketed publicly. [Refs. 6,47: p. 5., pp. 32, 33]
The Fund's managers can select particular issues and
maturities to help achieve their investment goals. They also
incur the risk associated with market/price fluctuations [Ref.
47: p. 33] . Because of this, the book value of the Fund's
assets fluctuate and must be taken into account when preparing
the Fund's financial statements. The Treasury handles the
investment by a book-entry system which simply credits
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purchases without physically issuing securities [Ref. 47: p.
32] . The Fund managers are free to sell the special issue
securities as needed to pay benefits or other authorized
spending. From the Treasury's perspective, the redemption
drains cash balances, which must then be replenished by tax
inflows or sale of marketable securities (borrowing) [Ref. 47:
p. 32] .
It is also significant to note that the Treasury
securities (government account series) held by the Fund do not
increase the national debt held by the public. They serve
mainly as an internal federal bookkeeping function and are
considered internal federal debt. As such, these Treasury
obligations add to the gross national debt through an increase
in internal federal debt but do not contribute to the national
debt held by the public. [Ref. 47: p. 4,5]
To gain perspective on the size of the debt created by the
MRF in relation to the total or gross national debt, a
breakdown of the national debt, shown in Figure 6.2, is
provided. At the end of FY 19 92, the gross national debt
amounted to approximately four trillion dollars [Ref. 47: p.
92] . The gross national debt can be broken down into two
categories, public debt and debt held by government accounts,
primarily federal trust funds [Ref. 47: p. 27]. In FY 1992,
debt held by federal trust funds accounted for one trillion
dollars or 25 percent of the gross national debt [Ref. 47: p.
27] . According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) , the
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Figure 6.2 Gross National Debt
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FY 1992 balance in the MRF was $88 billion dollars [Ref. 47:
p. 28] . The Fund therefore accounted for 2.2 percent of the
gross national debt or 8.8 percent of debt held by federal
trust funds in 1992.
E. LIMITS ASSOCIATED WITH THE MRF'S ASSETS
Because the Fund's assets are internal federal debt used
mainly for bookkeeping, it is erroneous to consider the
Military Retirement Fund as analogous to private pension funds
which have a pool of assets managed for the sole benefit of
recipients [Ref. 47: p. 28] . In fact, during hearings in 1983
on the Military Retirement System, an actuarial consultant
referred to federal retirement funds (such as the MRF) as
mirror games [Ref. 12: p. 155].
. . . in the case of the Federal Government and funding its
pension system under the mechanism that is currently
available, it is a mirror game.
Because the assets of the Fund are simply
intragovernmental IOUs, those affected by the Fund may be
concerned about the security of their benefits [Ref. 47: p.
27] . The reality is that the government has not really saved
money to pay for military retirement, but has simply earmarked
future tax receipts [Ref: 48: p. 11] . The Retirement Board of
Actuaries has classified the current funding system as
"accrual accounting without advance funding" [Ref 48: p. 3].
The interest (which from Figure 6.1 climbs rapidly in the
outyears) that is "earned" by the Fund's assets may be the
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most disconcerting aspect of the MRF . It is, in fact, not
earned at all but simply created (from a Federal
Government /unified budget perspective) and must be paid at
some time in the future with taxes or additional borrowing.
While the nature of the Fund's assets may produce some
concern, the current MRS still provides its intended purpose
of enhancing decision making about force levels and the cost
of benefits for new entrants [Refs. 47,48: p. 29, pp. 3, 11].
It may also provides a sense of security to military personnel
to know that the Fund has earmarked future tax receipts for
their retirement. While it is doubtful that many service
members know this, it does make the DoD's job of justifying
its outlays for retirees easier since the resources are
already earmarked. In this sense, it provides greater security
to the MRS as a whole and the government has formally
recognized its obligation to military retirees [Refs 47,48: p.
29,30 p. 3, 11] .
Despite concerns over the Funds assets, what really
matters to the Federal Government and military retirees is the
government's ability to tax and borrow to provide for the
actual outlays to retirees.
F. ALTERNATIVES TO TREASURY SECURITIES
While numerous proposals to invest federal trust funds in
private investments such as corporate stocks and bonds have
been made (mostly in regard to social security) , the
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difficulties arising from such a decision could be even more
disconcerting than the present system. [Ref. 47. p. 33, 34].
The risk associated with the stock and bond market
fluctuations would not go well with a public whose retirement
pay would then depend on fluctuating assets. Furthermore, the
Federal Government would be entangled in disputes and
conflicts associated with where to invest in the private
sector. The detrimental effects and instability created by
these decisions would probably offset any gains created
through higher return on assets which might be achieved in the
private sector. [Ref. 47: p. 33,34]
G. CONCLUSION
The Military Retirement Board of Actuaries and the Office
of the Actuary have established a specific timetable for
completing the payment on the unfunded liability and created
an actuarial plan for future normal cost payments. An
alternative to the current arrangement for handling gains and
losses to the Fund has been proposed by the Military
Retirement Board of Actuaries which would enhance the
incentive for the DoD to achieve saving through economizing on
manpower. It would also eliminate the responsibility of the
Treasury for the annual payment into the Fund once the
unfunded liability was paid off. Regardless of whether or not
the proposal is accepted, an alternative to the current plan
for adjusting gains and losses to the Fund should be
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developed. The goal of such a proposal should be to phase out
the Treasury's responsibility for making amortized payments
for gains and losses to the Fund and give the DoD sole
responsibility for providing for the Fund.
The Fund invests in internal federal debt which is used as
a bookkeeping function. As long as the Federal Government can
continue to tax and borrow to provide for the projected cash
outlays, then the fact that Fund is investing in internal
federal debt is not significant. What is relevant, from the
designer's perspective, is that the Fund operates on a sound
actuarial basis and that it provides the incentives to DoD
vthat were originally intended. By earmarking future tax
receipts for military retirement, the creation of the Fund has
enhanced the security and funding for military retirees.
VII. PROBLEMS AND CONCERNS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
MILITARY RETIREMENT FUND
A. INTRODUCTION
While some of the problems associated with the Military-
Retirement Fund have been outlined in Chapter VI, other
problems associated with diversions of the Fund's assets
exist. This chapter will outline a recent diversion of Fund
assets and potential future diversions. In addition, the
consequences of such diversions will be discussed.
B. UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS
The National Defense Authorization Act of fiscal year 1989
(Public Law 100-456) awarded United States Court of Military
Appeals (COMA) judges a significant increase in their
retirement benefits [Ref . 48: p. 11] . Judges who successfully
completed their term of service, for which they were
appointed, would receive an annuity equivalent to 80 percent
of the rate of pay for a COMA judge in active service [Ref.
50: Section 722] . In addition, the judge would receive cost-
of-living adjustments equivalent to those provided under the
federal civilian retirement program [Ref. 50: Section 722].
The law established the Military Retirement Fund as the source
of funding for retired COMA judges and removed the Civil
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Service Retirement and Disability Fund from any responsibility
[Ref. 48,50: p. 11, Section 722].
The impact of this law on the Military Retirement Fund is
negligible due to the small number of COMA judges [Ref. 48: p.
11] . And while providing retirement funding for COMA judges
from DoD funds is not an objectionable act, the precedent set
by this law is of concern to the DoD. This concern stems from
the practice of awarding benefits without arranging for
adjustments to the normal cost or Treasury payment. This
arrangement could threaten the actuarial integrity of the
Fund, especially if it occurred on a larger scale. In fact,
this precedent is being followed in a proposal for another
diversion of MRF resources, this time to assist the Armed
Forces Retirement Home Trust Funds [Ref. 48: p. 11]
.
C. DIVERSION OF MRF ASSETS TO THE ARMED FORCES RETIREMENT
HOME TRUST FUND
In 1992, a recommendation came from within the Office of
Management and Budget to fund shortfalls in Armed Forces
Retirement Home Trust Funds with assets from the Military
Retirement Fund [Ref. 48, 51: p. 11] . Unlike the diversion of
funds for COMA judges, this proposal would involve the
diversion of substantial sums [Ref. 48: p. 11].
The Armed Forces Retirement Home Trust Funds provide
medical and domiciliary care and other authorized benefits for
approximately 2000 selected retired solders and sailors. There
are actually two trust funds, one for the U.S. Soldier's and
Airmen's Home and one for the United States Naval Home.
Normally theses funds are sourced from fines, forfeitures, and
withheld pay and contributions from active members of the
services. The U.S. Naval Home trust fund appears to be
adequately funded through its receipts and interest [Ref . 19:
Appendix pp. 526-527]. However, the U.S Soldier's and
Airmen's trust fund is projected to lose money. For example,
in 1992 the balance in the fund was $127 million. In 1994 the
balance is projected to be $93 million. This is a loss of $34
million at a time when the fund should be growing. [Ref. 19:
Appendix pp. 526-527]
The Office of Management and Budget proposed to make up
the shortfall in the U.S. Soldier's and Airmen's Trust Fund
using the MRF [Ref. 48: p. 11] . Again, while it is not
objectionable to ask DoD to fund retirement homes for sailors
and soldiers, these additional costs should be incorporated
into the normal cost payments and unfunded liability payments
of the MRF.
If the Military Retirement Fund was required to make up
the shortfall, legislation should be extended that would allow
the DoD to make adjustments to the normal cost payments and
Treasury payments to include the cost of the diversion of MRF
funds. If this is not allowed, the actuarial integrity of the
Fund could be in question.
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An alternative solution would be to seek supplemental
funding from the three military services on a direct cost
basis. This would make the services proportionately
responsible for funding shortfalls based upon the number of
their service members in that retirement home.
The reason why the MRF has been the object of diversions
and potential diversions is probably because of its size.
With $106.1 billion in assets at the end of FY 1992, the Fund
is an attractive source of resources [Ref . 48: pp. 4, 11] . In
addition, underfunded activities, such as COMA judges and the
Armed Forces Retirement Homes, closely connected to military
retirement can more easily justify supplemental funding from
the MRF than they could otherwise. The DoD must be especially
diligent to keep the Fund operating on a sound actuarial basis
in light of the current fiscal constraints being experienced
by numerous government agencies
.
D. CONCLUSION
The Military Retirement Fund has been subject to
diversions and potential diversions which could threaten the
actuarial integrity of the Fund. If the Military Retirement
Fund becomes responsible for outlays to individuals for whom
the Fund's assets weren't originally intended, then
legislation should be extended which will allow for the normal
cost payment and Treasury payment to compensate for the
additional outlays.
VIII. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
The Military Retirement Fund was created in FY 1985
through legislation which reformed the accounting and funding
system for military retirees. The Fund serves to pay for the
costs of military retirement through a specific investment
plan created by the Department of Defense Office of the
Actuary and is designed to function similar to private pension
plans. The original purposes for the Military Retirement Fund
were: (1) to reduce costs; (2) to create incentives in the DoD
and Congress to consider future retirement expenses in today's
dollars and manpower numbers; (3) to implement accrual
accounting; and (4) to comply with ERISA.
The Military Retirement Fund invests in interest bearing
U.S. Treasury obligations and is funded through two separate
sources. The DoD is the first funding source, and pays for
the normal cost of future retirements through an annual
accrual payment identified as a percent of the basic pay
account in the annual Military Personnel Appropriation. The
second funding source, the U.S. Treasury, pays for the
original unfunded liability through annual amortization
payments. The Treasury's annual amortization payment is
adjusted by any cumulative gains and losses to the Fund and
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then deposited into the Military Retirement Fund. In addition
to these two funding sources, the Fund also receives as income
the interest on the Treasury securities contained in its
account . Since all three of the above sources of income are
intragovernmental transfers, offsetting receipts are created
in other accounts to prevent double counting in the unified
budget. The only outlays that count against the defense
function are the annual accrual charges, and the only outlays
that count against the Federal Government in the unified
budget are the actual outlays to military retirees. The net
result of the creation of the Military Retirement Fund has
been to decrease defense outlays, increase outlays from the
Treasury's General Fund, and increase federal debt. There has
been no direct impact on federal outlays.
The assets which flow to the Military Retirement Fund come
from permanent appropriations and annual appropriations. The
annual accrual charge is largely an annual appropriation,
while the Treasury payment and interest on the Fund's assets
are largely permanent appropriations. The Military Retirement
Reform Act of 1986, which reduced future retiree benefits,
provides an example of how the annual appropriation flow can
be used to produce defense savings, while the 1993 budget
reconciliation act demonstrates how the permanent
appropriation flow can be reduced as part of a deficit
reduction effort. The creation of the Military Retirement
Fund has increased the fiscal flexibility available to
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Congress as large and persistent deficits put pressure on all
federal programs .
The Department of Defense Office of the Actuary supplies
the Department of Defense with the necessary dollar figures
used by the DoD to budget for military retirement and the
payment on the unfunded liability. The computation of these
dollar figures is executed through a sophisticated computer
model which incorporates the effects of numerous retirement
benefits, decrement rates, DoD specific parameters and a broad
range of economic assumptions.
The assets of the Fund are a source of concern since the
Treasury obligations purchased by the Fund are considered
internally held federal debt used mainly for bookkeeping and
earmarking of future tax receipts. However, as long as the
Federal Government can continue to tax and borrow to provide
for the projected cash outlays, then the fact that Fund is
investing in internal federal debt is not significant. What
should be relevant, from the designer's perspective, is that
the Fund operates on a sound actuarial basis and that it
provides the incentives to DoD that were originally intended.
By earmarking future tax receipts for military retirement, the
creation of the Fund has enhanced the security and funding for
military retirees.
B . RECOMMENDATIONS
As stated earlier, the Treasury department captures all
the gains and losses to the Fund in its annual payment.
Furthermore, the Treasury will conceivably be involved in
making payments (positive or negative) to the Fund past the
point at which the unfunded liability has been paid off.
These two facts have not gone unnoticed and have resulted in
several recommendations to modify the current design of the
accrual charge and the allocation of cumulative gains and
losses to the Fund.
It is the opinion of the author that the design of the
system would best be served if the Treasury's involvement in
making payments to the Fund is phased out at the same time the
payment on the unfunded liability is completed. This should
produce a funding system similar to private funds where a
single entity is responsible for funding pension plans.
Furthermore, the original intent of Congress to have a DoD
accrual charge that reflects incentives to economize on
manpower would be left intact and possibly enhanced. If it
becomes apparent that the DoD incentive inherent in the
accrual charge is masked or distorted by large adjustments for
gains and losses, a modified schedule for amortizing gains and
losses should be considered.
The Military Retirement Fund has been subject to
diversions and potential diversions which could threaten the
actuarial integrity of the Fund. If the Military Retirement
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Fund becomes responsible for outlays to individuals for whom
the Fund's assets weren't originally intended, then
legislation should be extended which will allow for the normal
cost payment and Treasury payment to compensate for the
additional outlays.
C. FURTHER RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES
An analysis of other federal retirement funds such as the
Civil Service Retirement Fund and the Railroad Retirement Fund
compared with the MRF could produce significant insight into
the legislation and budgeting for federal retirement funds.
Of special interest would be a comparison of the Military
Retirement Fund's arrangement for handling unfunded
liabilities and gains and losses with the arrangement of other
federal retirement funds.
In September 1993, the Senate Appropriations Committee
recommended that the FY 1994 accrual charge be reduced by $600
million to account for gains in the Fund [Ref . 52: p. 10] . As
an alternative, the Committee stated it would be amenable
toward reprogramming $600 million out of other DoD funds to
produce the same "savings". The report did not specifically
endorse the proposal in the December 1992 report from the DoD
Board of Actuaries. It is interesting to note that the
Committee did not extend legislation which would allow the DoD
to modify the accrual charge or its ability to capture gains
or losses. An examination of DoD's response to this
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recommendation and the eventual outcome could provide further
insight into the politics and mechanics of budgeting for the
MRF.
D. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The establishment of the MRF has been a remarkable change
in the manner by which the DoD and Congress budget for
military retirement. The MRF has enhanced the security of the
Military Retirement System through the earmarking of future
revenues. Furthermore, the MRF not only creates cost
awareness, but increases the avenues by which military
retirement outlays can be curtailed. The funding arrangement
for the Military Retirement System is based upon actuarial
assumptions and schedules which must be carefully observed in
order to maintain the fidelity of the funding plan. As the
Federal Government continues to experience large and
persistent deficits, which are applying pressure throughout
federal programs, the pressure to reduce DoD costs through
modifying benefits and personnel costs will increase.
Furthermore, the pressure to produce savings through
diversions and modification of the current funding arrangement
and Fund gains and losses will also continue. While some of
the proposals to modify the current funding arrangement may be
favorable to the DoD, other proposals to modify the current
MRF arrangement may be unfavorable to the DoD and the
integrity of the Fund itself.
91
LIST OF REFERENCES
1. The Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Military
Retirement System , Lt Colonel J.L. Peel, Fort McNair,
D.C., December 14, 1987.
2. Department of Defense, .Report of the Fifth Quadrennial
Review of Military Compensation: Uniformed Services




Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense,
Military Compensation Background Pavers , USGPO, Washington
D.C. , June, 1987
.




5. Department of Defense, Office of the Actuary, Statistical
Report on the Military Retirement System , FY 1992.
6. Department of Defense, Office of the Actuary, Valuation
of the Military Retirement System , 30 September, 1992.
7. Office of Management and Budget, The Budget Of The United
States Government , USGPO, Washington, D.C, 1985.
8. Naval Postgraduate School, Practical Comptrollership
,
February, 1993.
9. Towel 1, P., "Military Retirement System Draws New
Scrutiny," Congressional Quarterly , April 6, 1985.
10. Bureau of the Budget, The Budget Of The United States
Government , USGPO, Washington D.C, 1956.
11. Department of Defense, Report of the Fifth Quadrennial
Review of Military Compensation: Uniformed Services
Retirement System (Vol. IA) , USGPO, Washington D.C,
January, 1984.
12. U.S. House of Representatives. Hearing Before the Task
Force on Entitlements , Uncontrollables , and Indexing of
the Committee on the Budget , 20 July, 1983.
13. Congressional Budget Office, Federal Financial Reporting:
Accrual Accounting and the Budget, June, 1977.
92
14. Congressional Budget Office, Military Retirement
Accounting Chancres : The Administration' s Proposals , June,
1978.
15. American Enterprise Institute Legislative Analysis,
Military Retirement
:
The Administration' s Plan and
Related Proposals , July, 1980.
16. Congressional Record, Amending Military Retirement System ,
April 16, 1980.
17. Congressional Budget Office, Accrual Accounting for
Military Retirement : Alternative Approaches , 1983
.
18. Public Law 98-94, Chapter 7'4 -Department of Defense
Military Retirement Fund , 24 September, 1983
.
19. Office of Management and Budget, The Budget Of The United
States Government , USGPO, Washington, D.C., 1994.
20. Congressional Research Service, A Defense Budget Primer
,
May 3, 1988.
21. Congressional Research Service, An Introduction to the
Spending and Budget Process in Congress , June 11, 1990.
22. Senate Report 99-292, Report to Accompany S. 2395 , USGPO,
Washington, D.C., April 28, 1986.
23. U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Report 99-292,
Report to Accompany S. 2395 , USGPO, Washington, D.C., May,
1, 1986.
24. "Presidential Address, " Congressional Quarterly , February,
20, 1993.




26. U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Budget,
Report 103-31, Concurrent Resolution on the Budget Report,
FY 1994 , USGPO, Washington, D.C., March 15, 1993.
27. Hughes, K., "COLAs Under Attack," Federal Times , August
23, 1993
28. U.S. Senate, Committee on the Budget, Report 103-19,
Concurrent Resolution on the Budget Report, FY 1994
,
USGPO, Washington, D.C., March 11, 1993.
93
29. Hager, G., "House Democrats Easily Back Clinton Budget
Blue Print," Congressional Quarterly , March 20, 1993.
30. "Senate Votes," Congressional Quarterly , March 27, 1993.
31. Congressional Record, Concurrent Resolution on the Budget
for Fiscal Year 1994 , USGPO, Washington, D.C., March 25,
1993.
32. U.S. House of Representatives, Committee of Conference,
Report 103-48, Conference Report to Accompany H. Con.
Res . 64 , USGPO, Washington, D.C., March 31, 1993.
33. "Status of Major Legislation," Congressional Quarterly
,
April 3, 1993.
34. Hager, G., "Clinton's Plan to Cut Deficit Begins Moving
in House," Congressional Quarterly , May 15, 19 93.
35. Congressional Record, Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1993 , USGPO, Washington, D.C., May 27, 1993.
36. "Status of Major Legislation," Congressional Quarterly ,
May 29, 1993
.
37. Senate Budget Committee, Minority Staff, Comparison of
Senate and House Reconciliation Bills , July 2, 19 93.
38. Cloud, D. S. and Rubin, A. J., "Energy Tax, Medicare Cuts
Focus of Senate Battle, " Congressional Quarterly , June 12,
1993.




40. Congressional Record, Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1993 , USGPO, Washington, D.C., June 24, 1993.
41. Hager, G. and Cloud, D.S., "Democrats Tie Their Fate To
Clinton's Budget Bill," Congressional Quarterly , August
7, 1993.
42. U.S. Senate, Committee on the Budget, Conference Agreement
on H.R. 2264, The Reconciliation Bill , August 5, 1993.
43. Hager, G., "As the Smoke Clears, Round 2 Looms,"
Congressional Quarterly , August 14, 1993.
44. Office of Management and Budget, Mid-Session Review of the
1994 Budget , USGPO, Washington, D.C., September 1993.
94
45. Marples, W. F., Actuarial Aspect of Pension Security
,
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1965.
46. Department of Defense, Office of the Actuary/ Valuation
of the Military Retirement System , 30 September, 1990.
47. Congressional Budget Office, Federal Debt and Interest
Costs , May, 19 93.
48. Department of Defense Retirement Board of Actuaries,
Report to the President and Congress on the Status of the
Department of Defense Military Retirement Fund , 31
December, 1992
.
49. General Accounting Office, POD BUDGET, Budget Impact of
Proposed Reduced Retirement Fund Payments , 5 June, 19 92.
50. Public Law 100-456, National Defense Authorization Act,
Fiscal Year 1989 , 29 September, 1988.
51. Telephone conversation between Benjamin I. Gottlieb, DoD
Office of the Actuary and LCDR S.J. Smithers, 21 October,
1993.
52. U.S. Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Report 103-153,
Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, 1994 , USGPO,




Defense Technical Information Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria VA 22304-6145
Library, Code 052 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey CA 93943-5002
Dr. Richard B. Doyle, Code AS/Dy 1
Department of Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943
Benjamin I. Gottlieb 1
Chief Actuary
DoD Office of the Actuary
160 North Wilson Boulevard
Room 43 8
Arlington, Virginia 22209-2593
LCDR Samuel J. Smithers 1
4133 Roundhill Road
Arlington, VA 22207
96






UwLtYKNOXLlBiVAKj
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOi
MONTEREY CA 93943-5101
GAYLORD S

